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ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE
SEVENTIES
W Wallace Kirkpatrick*

During the decade of the 1970s, the Antitrust Division of the United
States Department of Justice filed 650 cases. What kinds of cases were
they? What happened to them? What antitrust enforcement policies did
these cases reflect? This article will review the 650 cases filed during that
ten-year period, discuss the more interesting ones, and note changes in enforcement patterns and techniques reflected by the kinds of cases filed and
their disposition.
The 650 cases produced very little new case law because few of these
cases reached appellate courts. Fewer still led to significant decisions on
antitrust law. Only a handful of Supreme Court opinions were handed
down in these cases, and none of these opinions is of earth-shaking importance to antitrust law.
Antitrust, of course, deals with the undue concentration of economic
power. In this regard it is interesting to note that approximately 190 of the
650 cases included as defendants corporations named in the current Fortune lists of the first and second largest 500 industrial corporations.' Almost thirty percent of the cases filed named as a defendant at least one of
the major industrial corporations of the country. In light of the frequent
criticism that antitrust enforcement ignores big companies and spends its
* Professor Emeritus of Law and formerly Associate Dean, The National Law Center
of the George Washington University. Previously First Assistant and Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice. A.B., LL.B., Harvard University. Member New York and District of Columbia Bars.
1. The number of cases which named at least one defendant from the Fortune lists is
inexact, and undoubtedly should be appreciably larger. The defendants named in the cases
filed in the 1970s were checked against the list of the 500 largest industrial corporations
published in Fortune magazine of May 5, 1980, and against the list of the second 500 largest
industrial corporations, published in Fortune's issue of June 16, 1980. No doubt some defendants named in the cases were among the largest corporations when the case was filed.
Some companies on the lists were without doubt smaller when they were named as defendants. The lists of major financial, transportation, and public utility concerns were not
checked. Although admittedly inexact, the number of 190 cases does show that a very substantial proportion of the cases filed named major industrial concerns as defendants.
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resources on matters of small economic significance, this high percentage is
worth emphasizing.
Over the ten-year period, almost two-thirds of the cases filed were civil
proceedings. Criminal prosecutions accounted for slightly over one-third
of the cases. Table 12 shows a breakdown by year of the total number of
cases filed, and the number and percentage of both civil and criminal
cases. Table I also shows the number and percentage of both civil and
criminal cases that were easily disposed of. For the criminal cases, the
easy dispositions were accomplished by the acceptance of pleas rather than
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holding trials or hearings. Eighty percent of the criminal cases were disposed of by pleas of nolo contendere or guilty. The great majority of the
2. This and the other tables in this article were compiled by the author from an examination of the cases filed and their disposition. For the year 1979, of the 29 civil cases filed,
some 20 had not been finally disposed of by October 1, 1980. In view of this, no percentage
of civil cases settled by agreement for that year seems meaningful.
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civil cases were disposed of by the entry of a consent judgment or by the
dismissal of the case by the government when the challenged merger was
abandoned or the relief sought was obtained in other ways.
It is interesting to compare the figures in Table I with similar figures for
prior years. The total number of cases filed each year in the seventies varied from ninety-six to fifty-one, and averaged sixty-five. In the preceding
quarter century, the total number of cases filed annually ran from ninetyfour to twenty-five, averaging fifty. The percentage of civil cases averaged
sixty-three percent for the seventies; for the previous years it averaged
sixty-two percent.
3. Kirkpatrick, Antitrust to the Supreme Court: The Expediting Act, 37 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 746 (1969), contained the following table at 752, showing a breakdown of antitrust
cases filed for the years 1944 through 1968.
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It is obvious from Table I that few criminal cases were brought in the
years 1970 and 1971. This is a reflection of the then-current enforcement
policy deemphasizing criminal antitrust prosecutions. Thereafter, an appreciably larger percentage of the total cases filed were on the criminal
side. In some years more than half of all cases were criminal. This temporary downplaying of the criminal enforcement tool was even more dramatically reflected in 1969, when only one criminal case was filed out of a total
4
of forty-five cases.
Antitrust enforcement policy is, of course, determined primarily by the
Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, both of whom are presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation. However, policy control by these officials cannot be
exercised immediately because of the extended period of time necessary to
prepare an antitrust case before it can be filed. A preliminary investigation, a full field investigation, discovery through civil investigative demands, perhaps even a grand jury investigation, can consume many
months and even years before the government is ready to file a case.
When a newly appointed head of the Antitrust Division takes office, the
cases filed the next week, or the next month, are not necessarily a reflection
of his ideas. The length of the pipeline for preparation of antitrust cases
distorts the picture of a particular official's enforcement policies.
With this in mind, it is interesting to note the officials responsible for
antitrust policy in the seventies. At the beginning of the decade, John
Mitchell was the Attorney General and Richard W. McLaren was Assistant Attorney General heading the Antitrust Division. In 1972, Richard J.
Kleindienst became Attorney General, followed by Elliot L. Richardson in
4. In 1969, 44 civil cases were filed, of which 21 were settled by the entry of a consent
decree. The one criminal case was United States v. Dunham Concrete Prod., Inc., 475 F.2d
1241 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); 501 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1974) (order for
new trial of individual defendant reversed), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975), involving extortion as well as an alleged Sherman Act offense.
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the middle of 1973 and William B. Saxbe at the beginning of 1974. Edward H. Levi became Attorney General in the beginning of 1975 and was
succeeded by Griffin B. Bell when the administration changed in early
1977. Benjamin R. Civiletti replaced Bell in the middle of 1979.
McLaren was named to the federal bench in 1972. Thomas E. Kauper
succeeded him as head of the Antitrust Division. In the middle of 1976
Donald I. Baker became Assistant Attorney General. After the administration changed in 1977, John H. Shenefield became the Assistant Attorney
General and remained in that post through the end of the decade.
I.

SHERMAN ACT CIVIL CASES

Civil cases comprised 410 of the 650 cases filed in the seventies. Of these
civil cases, 279 were alleged violations of the Sherman Act, almost exclusively of section 1 of the Sherman Act.5 Table II6 shows the breakdown by
year of the civil Sherman Act cases filed by the Antitrust Division. The
Sherman Act cases usually represented more than half of the total civil
cases filed, and in some years accounted for the great bulk of the civil
filings.
For many years, the Department of Justice has "had a policy of filing, in
appropriate circumstances, a "companion" civil case to a criminal proceeding, filed at the same time and alleging the same offense, usually in
identical phraseology. In most instances the defendants in both the criminal and the civil proceedings are the same, although at times individuals
indicted in the criminal case are not named as defendants in the civil case.
Since the purpose of the criminal case is to punish for past offenses, while
the civil case is designed to prevent violations in the future, it is often ap5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). Section I provides in part: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
6. See note 2 supra.
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propriate to file both types of cases in a given factual context. Table II
shows the number of civil filings which were "companion" cases to criminal prosecutions.
TABLE II
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In 1965, Mr. Justice Douglas writing for the Supreme Court in Federal
Trade Commission v. ConsolidatedFoods Corp.7 said that "'reciprocity'
• . .is one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust laws are aimed." 8 Subsequently the Antitrust Division filed civil
complaints attacking reciprocal dealings by various large companies. Table II shows the number of such cases filed in the seventies.
7. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
8. Id. at 594.
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As was noted above in Table I, the great majority of civil cases filed,
almost three-fourths, were disposed of by consent decree. The figure for
Sherman Act civil cases settled by consent judgments is slightly higher,
seventy-eight percent. But what is much more interesting about the consent judgment figures is the disappearance of the practice of filing such
judgments at the same time as the complaint is filed. About twenty years
ago, the Antitrust Division initiated the practice, in appropriate cases, of
negotiating a consent decree with the companies under investigation prior
to filing a formal complaint. The complaint would then be filed and the
decree submitted to the court at the same time and announced in one press
release. This practice of negotiating settlements in advance was used in
numerous cases in the past, but was totally abandoned during the last four
years of the decade.
Only thirty-two cases are listed under "Trials" in Table II, almost all of
which were losses for the government.9 This category of cases includes
various proceedings or hearings, as well as regular trials, but excludes negotiated dispositions. Only five of these civil Sherman Act cases found
their way to appellate courts.'°
9. The only one of the 38 Sherman Act cases filed in 1970 to actually come to trial was
dismissed after the presentation of the government's case in chief. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Included in the eight 1972 cases
where the defendant prevailed at trial are three cases filed against each of the major television networks for monopolizing prime time television programming. A consent order settling the suit as it related to one of the codefendants (Viacom International, Inc., a former
CBS subsidiary) was entered on Jan. 17, 1973. United States v. CBS, 1973-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 74,269 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1973). The suits against the three networks, however,
were dismissed without prejudice for the government's failure to comply with discovery orders to produce presidential documents which defendants asserted would show that the cases
were filed because of President Nixon's desire for revenge. United States v. NBC, 65 F.R.D.
415 (C.D. Cal. 1975), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 421 U.S. 940 (1975). New
complaints were filed less than a month later. Final consent decrees have been entered in
the refiled cases for all three of the networks. United States v. NBC, Inc., 1978-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 61,855 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 1977); United States v. CBS, [1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 63,594 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 1980); United States v. ABC, [1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) $ 50,766 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1980). One of the three cases which defendants won in
1975 was dismissed at the request of the government after a verdict of acquittal had been
directed at the close of the government's evidence in the companion criminal case-. United
States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 45,075 (Case No. 2466) (S.D. Cal. July 19, 1976).
10. National Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978) (association
not immune from antitrust attack under Capper-Volstead Act); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (association's code of ethics violated § 1
of the Sherman Act); United States v. National Ass'n of Security Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694
(1975) (association rules immune from antitrust attack under § 22 of the Investment Act of
1940); United States v. Texas State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 464 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Tex.
1978), modified, af'dper curiam, 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 925

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 30:431

Perhaps the most interesting of the five was National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United Slates." The defendant Society had a membership of 69,000 graduate engineers, representing about seventeen percent of
the nation's engineers registered or licensed to practice by the various
states. The Society's code of ethics prohibited members from submitting
competitive bids for their engineering services, and the United States
charged that this violated section 1 of the Sherman Act since it eliminated
price competition. The trial judge agreed,' 2 holding that engineering, a
learned profession, was not exempt from the Sherman Act, and that there
was no "state action" here to protect the defendant. The trial judge had no
trouble in finding that the challenged part of the code of ethics amounted
to aper se violation of section 1:
The Court is convinced that the ethical prohibition against competitive bidding is on its face a tampering with the price structure
of engineering fees in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act ...
The agreement among defendant's members to refrain from competitive bidding is an agreement to restrict the free play of market
forces from determining price. 13
The district court held that the code provision acted to fix prices and accordingly wasper se an unreasonable restraint of trade; there was no need
to consider whether the activity served an honorable or worthy end; and
there was no occasion to test the code under the rule of reason.
Under the Expediting Act then in force 4 the defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending, the Court
decided Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,'5 which held a fee schedule
adopted by a bar association violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Therefore, the Court vacated the lower court's ruling in NationalSociety of
ProfessionalEngineers and remanded the case for reconsideration in light
of the Goldfarb opinion.' 6
On remand, the district court adhered to its previous decision, holding
(1979) (ban on competitive bidding illegal); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 393 F. Supp.
903 (W.D. Mo. 1975), af'd, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977)
(trial court decision for defendant affirmed).
11.435 U.S. 679 (1978).
12. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193 (D.D.C.
1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975), decision on remand, 404 F. Supp. 457
(D.D.C. 1975), af'd in part, remanded/or modification in decree, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir.
1977), aff'd, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
13. 389 F. Supp. at 1200.
14. Expediting Act, ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823 (1903) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 29
(1974)).
15. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
16. 422 U.S. 1031 (1975).
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17
the code of ethics to be aper se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The main question on remand was the meaning of the Supreme Court's
footnote 17 in the Goldfarb opinion, suggesting some distinction between a
profession and a business.' 8 The district court found, however, that the
code provision was a per se violation since it dealt with the profession's
business aspects rather than membership requirements or standards of

conduct. 19

Under a new appellate procedure 20 the case was appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. That court affirmed,
agreeing with the district court that the ethics code provision was aper se
violation and that there was no occasion to consider the price-fixing arrangement under a rule of reason approach.2 1
The Supreme Court, in its review of the decision, took the opportunity
to provide considerable clarification in the previously confused area of the
per se and rule of reason approaches to Sherman Act violations. The Society argued that the ban on competitive bidding in its code of ethics was not
a Sherman Act violation because it was necessary to prevent defective engineering work which would result from attempts to submit the lowest possible bid. This would, the Society contended, endanger the public safety.
Accordingly, the ethical ban should have been weighed under the rule of
reason, and the district court's failure to do so precluded affirmance of its
judgment.2 2
The Supreme Court held that this argument rested on a "fundamental
misunderstanding of the Rule of Reason."2 3 The rule of reason "does not
17. 404 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1975).
18. Footnote 17 states:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates
the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as
interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the
professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other situation than the
one with which we are confronted today.
421 U.S. at 788-89, n.17.
19. 404 F. Supp. at 461.
20. The Expediting Act of 1903 was amended by the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 5, 88 Stat. 1709 (1974) (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 29
(1976)), to provide for an initial review in the courts of appeals in most antitrust cases.
21. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 555 F.2d 978, 980-84 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
22. 435 U.S. 679, 687, 693-94 (1978).
23. Id at 681.
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open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged
restraint that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions. 2 4
The Court pointed out that "unreasonableness" could be based either on
the nature or character of the contract or act, or any surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption that the contract or act
was intended to restrain trade and enhance prices." The Court concluded:
There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust
analysis. In the first category are agreements whose nature and
necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate
study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality-they
are "illegalperse." In the second category are agreements whose
competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts
peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed. In either event, the purpose of the
analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance
of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members
of an industry. Subject to exceptions defined by
statute, that pol26
icy decision has been made by the Congress.
The Court found that the code of ethics' ban on competitive bidding
amounted to aper se violation:
In this case we are presented with an agreement among competitors to refuse to discuss prices with potential customers until after
negotiations have resulted in the initial selection of an engineer.
While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of
such an agreement. . . . On its face, this agreement restrains
trade within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act.2 7
The Court pointed out that there was no broad exemption under the rule
of reason for licensed professions. Ethical norms may serve to regulate
and promote competition in the furnishing of professional services, but the
rule of reason "does not support a defense based on the assumption that
competition itself is unreasonable. 2 8
Two other Supreme Court decisions resulted from civil Sherman Act
24. Id at 688.
25. Id. at 690.
26. Id at 692 (footnote omitted).
27. Id at 692-93.
28. Id. at 696. Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist did not join in the entire majority
opinion written by Justice Stevens, although they concurred in the judgment. Id at 699.
Chief Justice Burger concurred and dissented in part. Id at 701.
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cases filed in the seventies, but these opinions are much less interesting. In
February 1973, the government charged the National Association of Security Dealers, six large mutual funds, and nine major brokerage firms
with violating section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to prevent the
development of a secondary market for mutual fund shares. The complaint, in eight counts, was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that
the practices attacked were "immune from ordinary antitrust strictures"
because of the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.29
The Supreme Court affirmed in a five to four opinion.3 ° Mr. Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, found that the provisions of the Investment Company Act and the Securities Exchange Act either immunized the
challenged practices from the Sherman Act or provided a sufficiently pervasive regulatory authority for the Securities and Exchange Commission
that there was an implied immunity from antitrust liability. Justice White,
writing for himself and Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, dissented, arguing that no implied antitrust immunity arose from the statutes
involved in this case. 3 '
In NationalBroiler MarketingAssociation v. United States32 the defendant had been charged with violating section 1 of the Sherman Act by fixing
prices for chickens. The district court dismissed the complaint3 3 on the
ground that the defendant was given immunity from the Sherman Act by
the Capper-Volstead Act34 dealing with agricultural cooperatives. The
sole issue was whether the defendant qualified for Capper-Volstead immunity, since the members of the Association used contract growers in raising
the chickens to marketable age. The government argued that the members
were not "producers." The trial court ruled against the government, but
the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that Capper-Volstead gave antitrust protection only to farmers and producers of agricultural products and
not to all businesses in the industry.3 5
The Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that the Capper-Volstead
protection from the Sherman Act did not extend to an association whose
29. United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1973),
aff'd, 422 U.S. 694 (1975). See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l, 80a22, 80a-22(d) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78j(b), 78o-3 (1976).
30. 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
31. Id at 735 (White, J., dissenting).
32. 436 U.S. 816 (1978).
33. United States v. National Broiler Marketing Ass'n, 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
60,509 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 1975).
34. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
35. 550 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 436 U.S. 816 (1978).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 30:431

members were essentially processors or packers and not farmers. 36 Justice
White, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented on the ground that the statutory immunity should benefit all producers who partake in the risks of
bringing an agricultural product to market.3 7 On remand, the suit was
dismissed by agreement between the parties, since the defendant association had abandoned the challenged practices and was in the process of
dissolving.
A number of other cases filed in the seventies must be mentioned. The
most interesting was UnitedStates v. GeneralMotors Corp. ,38 in which the
government tested unsuccessfully an approach to the "conspiracy" element
of section 1 of the Sherman Act that had long been talked about but never
put to the test. The government charged, in a two count indictment and in
a companion civil complaint, that both General Motors and Ford had violated both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 39 The section 1 charge,
identically worded in both the indictment and the complaint, was that the
defendants had engaged in a combination and conspiracy to unreasonably
restrain the manufacture, sale and distribution of automobiles for the fleet
market. The combination and conspiracy consisted of an agreement to
eliminate price concessions in the sale or lease of automobiles to the fleet
market.4 ° Nine acts of the defendants in furtherance of the combination
were specified. These included making individual public statements about
their desire to eliminate price concessions and the difficulty of doing so
unilaterally. It was also alleged that "certain officers and employees" of
the two defendants individually made statements to industry groups about
their willingness to discontinue price concessions, expecting the statements
would be transmitted to the competition. 4 There was no suggestion that
the defendants ever got together or communicated directly with each other
concerning price concessions for fleet market sales, and the pleadings implicitly repudiated any such direct entry into a "combination or conspiracy."
The trial judge took the unusual step of ordering simultaneous civil and
criminal trials:
In view of the similarity of the factual and legal issues
36. 436 U.S. 816 (1978). The issue was of sufficient importance in the broiler industry
that 19 states filed amicus curiae briefs before the Supreme Court.

37. Id. at 840 (White, J., dissenting).
38. 369 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D. Mich. 1974). See also 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 1974); [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.(CCH)
(Case No. 2238) (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 1974).

39. 369 F. Supp. at 1306.
40. 1974-2 Trade Cas., 75,253 at 97,657.
41. Id. at 97,664.

75,253
45,072
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presented by the government's prosecution of both criminal and
civil proceedings, the court decided that the civil and criminal
cases should be tried together with a jury impanelled to decide
issues of fact in the criminal case and with the court sitting as the
trier of fact in the civil case. Simultaneous trials in the civil and
criminal proceedings began on September 4, 1973, and continued
for some 15 weeks. After all sides had rested in the criminal case,
the court granted defendants' motion for judgment of acquittal
on the alleged violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
case was submitted to the jury for determination on the Government's allegations relating to the claimed violation of Section 1 of
that act. On December 19, 1973, the jury returned a verdict of
not guilty as to both defendants.42
After making elaborate findings, the court dismissed the civil case, concluding that no agreement or conspiracy had been established. The court
pointed out that basic to the government's case was the issue of whether
the defendants had agreed with each other, directly or indirectly, to
eliminate fleet discounts. The court reviewed the cases explaining an
"agreement" and concluded that the defendants never agreed with anyone
to eliminate fleet discounts:
Finally, the government's theory in this case comes dangerously close to precluding lawful pricing activity as part of vigorous price competition. Neither a pricing move by a competitor,
nor a requested pricing change by a customer, can be regarded as
an invitation to conspire which precludes a business from acting
in its best economic interest by changing its prices when desirable. . . . The public announcement of a pricing decision cannot
be twisted into an invitation or signal to conspire; it is instead an
economic reality to which all other competitors must react. The
government has not shown that either defendant intended its
pricing moves to be a signal of its willingness to take specific additional pricing actions.4 3
Perhaps the most significant case filed in the last decade was the section
2 complaint against AT&T, Western Electric and Bell Labs.' American
Telephone and Telegraph Co., reputedly the largest privately owned corporation in the world, and its two subsidiaries are alleged to have monopolized telecommunications services and equipment. The complaint prays
for the divestiture of Western Electric, the Bell system manufacturer of
42. Id. at 97,656-57.
43. Id at 97,67 1.
44. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder]
REG. REP. (CCH) 1 45,074 (Case No. 2416) (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 1974).
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equipment, from AT&T, and the separation of some or all of the Long
Lines Department of AT&T from some or all of the Bell operating companies.45
Efforts by the defendants to assert that prior litigation precluded the suit
or that they were immune from antitrust sanctions failed. The trial court
has held that it has jurisdiction, and attempts to get higher courts to review
this decision have failed. The court has also issued various orders dealing
with discovery and stipulations. 46 The future course of this litigation will
certainly be interesting, but its final outcome may not be known for years
to come.
Another significant and still unresolved case is United States v. Bechtel
Corp.47 Bechtel, one of the world's largest prime contractors for major
construction projects for government and large business, was charged with
violating section 1 of the Sherman Act by refusing to deal with subcontractors in Arab League countries who were blacklisted by Arab organizations
seeking an effective boycott of Israel.
A year after the suit was filed a consent judgment was filed, generally
enjoining Bechtel from adhering to any blacklist put out by Arab countries
or boycotting any subcontractor for such reasons. Thereafter both parties
filed competitive impact statements and comments were received from numerous sources. Meanwhile the Export Administration Amendments of
197748 became laW, providing a set of rules governing business practices of
United States concerns in relation to international political boycotts.
However, when the government moved, in 1978, for entry of the judgment,
Bechtel claimed to have withdrawn its consent to the judgment, on the
grounds of asserted conflicts with the intervening legislation, and interpretations given the judgment by the government with which Bechtel strongly
disagreed. Despite the absence of the defendant's consent, the court-two
years after the consent decree had been filed-ordered the judgment to be
entered.4 9
45. Id
46. For the various reported preliminary decisions in this on-going case, see United
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976), cert. beforejudgment denied, 429 U.S.
1071 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86
F.R.D. 603 (D.D.C. 1980); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 F.R.D. 350
(D.D.C. 1979); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 83 F.R.D. 323 (D.D.C. 1979).
47. [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,076 (Case No. 2497)
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 1976). In addition to Bechtel Corp., four affiliates were named defendants.
48. Pub. L. No. 95-52, 9,1 Stat. 235 (1977) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 et
seq. (Supp. II1 1979)).
49. See United States v. Bechtel Corp., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,429 (N.D. Cal.
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Aside from the fascinating question of a "consent" decree being entered
over the vigorous objections of the "consenting" defendant, the case raises
a very serious and perplexing question of the applicability of the antitrust
laws outside the commercial arena. Does a boycott violate the Sherman
Act when its sole motive is political or religious? Should the antitrust laws
be applied to noncommercial conduct? The Supreme Court years ago in
Apex Hosiery v. Leader5" held a violent sit-in strike used in labor warfare
was not a Sherman Act problem. In EasternR.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight,Inc., the Supreme Court specifically refused to impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate political activity." Other
recent cases have refused to apply the Sherman Act in situations where the
questioned conduct was political or religious rather than commercial.5 2
This seems much the better view, and Bechtelrepresentsa very unfortunate
prosecutorial decision to file such a complaint.
Several cases in the seventies involved allegations of patent misuse. In
United States v. Bristol Myers Co. , two drug manufacturing companies
were charged with fraudently procuring and enforcing a patent on ampicillin, a semisynthetic penicillin. One of the defendants agreed to the entry of
a consent judgment, but there is no reported action terminating the case
with respect to the American defendant, Bristol Myers Co. In another
case, Westinghouse Electric Co. and some Japanese manufacturers of electrical products were charged with exchanging patent and technology
licenses, paying royalties regardless of any patent use, and misusing patents. The trial court dismissed the case, holding that the government had
failed to show any misuse or abuse of patents. 54 Another case charged that
a patent covering a process for making aluminum trialkyls (used as chemical intermediates) was being extended improperly by the defendants to
cover unpatented products. A consent judgment was entered as to the
three American companies that were defendants, and the district court
55
found the arrangements illegal as to the German patentee.
Jan. 5, 1979); United States v. Bechtel Corp., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,430 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 5, 1979).
50. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
51. 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961).
52. Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980); Council
for Employment & Economic Energy Use v. WHDH Corp., 580 F.2d 9 (Ist Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F.
Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1980); Costello Publishing Co. v. Rotelle, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,499 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1980).
53. 1979-2 Trade Cas. 62,738 (D.D.C. May 21, 1979).
54. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1978).

55. United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
(D.D.C. Oct. 3, 1978).

62,291
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Monopolization of rear projection read-outs, achieved in part by defendant's acquisition of patents and filing of infringement suits in order to
harm competitors, was alleged in United States v. IndustrialElectronic Engineers, Inc. A consent decree provided, among other things, for royaltyfree non-exclusive licensing of certain patents. 56 Two other cases involved
research and development. One was brought against United Aircraft
charging it with violating section 2 of the Sherman Act by attempting to
monopolize research and development in fuel cells by various agreements
with TRW, blocking the latter's research in this area. A consent judgment
prohibited such restrictive agreements.-" In another case, the government
charged Manufacturers Aircraft Association and twenty of its corporate
members, including all the major manufacturers of airplanes, with violating section 1 by eliminating competition in research and development in
patents and patentable inventions. The case was terminated by a consent
judgment providing for the dissolution of the defendant association and
appropriate injunctive relief. 8
A series of three cases charged distributors of nickel with violating both
section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibiting
tie-in sales, by selling nickel, then in short supply, to customers who required it for electroplating only on the condition the customer also buy
electroplating materials such as acids, salts, chemicals, and equipment
from the defendant. Two of these cases were settled by a consent judgment, and the third dismissed when relief was obtained in another proceeding.5 9
Professional associations were named as defendants in five other cases.
Three of these involved codes or standards of ethics that contained provisions prohibiting competitive bidding or limiting conditions under which
price proposals could be submitted. The separate cases involved the
American Society of Civil Engineers,6" the American Institute of Architects," and American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc.62
56. 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,734 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1977).
57. United States v. United Aircraft Corp., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 74,467 (D.
Conn. June 11, 1973).
58. United States v. Manufacturers Aircraft Ass'n, Inc. 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
60,810 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1975).
59. United States v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,536
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1975); United States v. Kewanee Oil Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
60,537 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1975); United States v. Udylite Corp., 1979-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,468 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1975). See Occidental Petroleum Corp., 77 F.T.C. 710
(1970).
60. United States v. American Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,950
(S.D.N.Y. June I, 1972).
61. United States v. American Inst. of Architects, 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,981
(D.D.C. June 19, 1972), modfied, 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,074 (D.D.C. June 19, 1972).
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Each case was terminated by the entry of a consent judgment at the same
time the complaint was filed. In 1976, a civil contempt action was filed
against the American Society of Civil Engineers for violating this decree,
and the Society was found to be in contempt.63
The other two professional association cases involved bar associations.
A suit was filed against the Oregon State Bar charging that it violated section 1 by issuing a uniform fee schedule. The complaint was dismissed
eighteen months after it was filed when the court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss on grounds of mootness, the association having withdrawn its fee schedule. 64 The other case named the American Bar Association and charged a violation of section 1 because of the Association's
prohibition of advertising by lawyers. The court dismissed the case in August, 1978.65
A few more cases merit brief comment. In 1972, each of the three major
television networks was charged, in separate suits, with violating sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act by restricting competition for and monopolizing
prime-time entertainment programs. Each case alleged that the defendant
used its control over access to prime-time television to block programs of
independents or programs in which the defendant had no ownership interest.66 The National Association of Broadcasters was accused of violating
section 1 by the "overcommercialization" rules in its Code which unduly
restrict the quantity and format of advertising.67
Two cases involved major exchanges. The Chicago Board of Trade
agreed to the entry of a consent judgment terminating a case which had
alleged fixing of rates and fees for trading in commodity futures contracts.68 A suit against the Chicago Board Options Exchange alleging the
fixing of fees and commissions for trading in securities options was dismissed by the court after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in a suit
62. United States v. American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 74,007 (D.D.C. July 6, 1972).
63. The court found the defendant had violated the earlier judgment, and ordered that
certain disciplinary action taken against some members be rescinded. United States v.
American Soc'y of Civil Engineers, 446 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
64. United States v. Oregon State Bar, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 45,074 (Case No. 2383) (D. Or. May 9, 1974). See United States v. Oregon State
Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Or. 1974).
65. United States v. American Bar Ass'n, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
45,076 (Case No. 2524) (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 1976).
REP. (CCH)
66. See note 9 supra.
67. United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder]
45,079 (Case No. 2708) (D.D.C. June 14, 1979).
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
68. United States v. Board of Trade, Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,071 (N.D. Ill.
June 28, 1974).
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involving another exchange. 69
A few other cases alleged interesting trade restraining practices. Pittsburgh Area Pontiac Dealers were charged with price fixing because the
dealers agreed to advertise as a group and list prices for particular models;
a consent judgment ended the suit.7" A case filed in Massachusetts alleged
that a bank which leased space for a branch in New England's largest
shopping center violated section 1 by a clause in the lease forbidding the
lessor to rent space to any other financial institution.7 Two Atlanta readymix concrete companies were charged with coercing their suppliers to use
the services of a particular bank, a codefendant: a consent judgment was
filed at the same time as the complaint.72
A roofers association was sued because its members agreed that guarantees on replacement roofs would only apply for two years' time: 73 a consent judgment was entered. Three firms were accused of violating both
sections 1 and 2 in connection with trade in chrysanthemum cuttings: the
defendants agreed to a judgment. 4
II.

CLAYTON ACT CASES

In the decade of the seventies, the Antitrust Division filed 124 cases
charging violations of the Clayton Act. 75 The great majority of these, 11l
cases, were brought under section 7.76 Nine cases were filed under section
69. United States v. Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc., [1970-1979 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,073 (Case No. 2319) (Aug. 25, 1975). See Gordon v.
New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (finding fixed commission rates, since actively supervised by the SEC, to be outside the reach of the Sherman Act).
70. United States v. Pittsburgh Area Pontiac Dealers, Inc., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,233 (W.D. Pa. July 24, 1978).
71. United States v. Warren Five Cents Savings Bank, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
45,079 (Case No. 2710) (June 29, 1979).
72. United States v. Jackson's Atlanta Ready Mix Concrete Co., 1972 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 73,827 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 1972).
73. United States v. Roofing, Metal & Heating Assocs., Inc., 1973-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,736 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 1973).
74. United States v. Yoder Bros., Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,820 (N.D. Ohio
Mar. 15, 1972).
75. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
76. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)).
The first paragraph of § 7 reads:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.
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4A 7 7 and four under section 8.78 In addition, seven civil contempt cases
were initiated.
Table III shows details of the section 7 Clayton Act cases by each year.
Because bank mergers comprised a major share of the merger cases, and
because the Bank Merger Act of 196679 singled out this kind of merger for
TABLE III
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special treatment, the statistics for bank mergers are indicated in the table
in parentheses. Far fewer section 4a and section 8 cases were filed, and
77. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4a, as amended, ch. 283, § 1, 69 Stat. 282 (1955) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976)). This section permits the United States to recover actual damages
sustained by it in its business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws.
78. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 8, 38 Stat. 732 (1914), as amended, (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 19 (1976)). This section forbids interlocking directors serving competing corporations.
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976). The genesis and nature of this statute are dealt with in
Kirkpatrick, Antitrust to the Supreme Court. The Expediting Act, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
746, 777-80 (1969).
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only total numbers are shown. Few civil contempt cases were brought, and
they are included in this table to complete the total number of civil cases
filed in each year of the decade.
The decline in the number of section 7 merger cases filed in the later
years of the decade is pronounced, and the decline in the number of bank
mergers challenged is even more pronounced. More than half of all
merger cases filed were disposed of by the entry of a consent judgment,
which almost invariably required the divestiture of certain property by the
defendant, or by the government's dismissal of the case following the
abandonment of the merger plans by the parties. The most interesting
figure in Table III is the number of merger cases which went to trial and
resulted in a victory for the defendants. Of all the cases that were not
settled by agreement, the government prevailed in only sixteen percent.
Three of the merger cases filed in the seventies, each of which involved
banks, led to major Supreme Court decisions. Two of these Supreme
Court opinions dealt with the "potential competition" doctrine and did
very little to clarify the law in that area. The potential competition doctrine has had something of a checkered career, and there is some question
whether it is still alive. Apparently the term was first used by the Supreme
Court in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. ,80 but that case was
really one of actual rather than potential competition, and the doctrine was
defined more clearly in UnitedStates v. FalstaffBrewing Corp."' The latter
case was filed by the government in 1965, and charged that Falstaff, a national brewer which did not sell in the northeast, violated section 7 by
acquiring the largest New England brewery. The trial court found that
Falstaff would not have entered the New England market by any route
other than acquisition of the largest local brewery, and dismissed the complaint.8 2
On appeal, Justice White wrote the opinion for the Supreme Court. After pointing out the types of mergers condemned by section 7, White continued:
Suspect also is the acquisition by a company not competing in the
market but so situated as to be a potential competitor and likely
to exercise substantial influence on market behavior. Entry
through merger by such a company, although its competitive
conduct in the market may be the mirror image of that of the
acquired company, may nevertheless violate § 7 because the en80. 376 U.S. 651, 659 (1964).
81. 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
82. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 332 F. Supp. 970 (D.R.I. 1971), rev'd and
remanded, 410 U.S. 526 (1973), decision on remand, 383 F. Supp. 1020 (D.R.I. 1974).
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try eliminates a potential competitor exercising present influence
on the market. As the Court stated in United States v. Penn- Olin
Chemical Co., . . . "The existence of an aggressive, well
equipped and well financed corporation engaged in the same or
related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be a substantial incentive to competition
which cannot be underestimated." 8 3
The Court said that the key question was whether it would be reasonable
to consider Falstaff as a potential entrant into the New England market
given the conditions of that market and Falstafi's capabilities. The internal
company decision not to enter the market except by acquisition was relatively less important. On remand, the trial court was to consider this question.84
In United States v. First National Bankcorporation,"5 which was argued
with Falstaff, the government challenged the acquisition by the largest
banking organization in Colorado, headquartered in Denver, of a bank in
Greely, 50 miles north of Denver, which was the third largest independent
bank outside Denver. The government relied on the theory of potential
competition, since no direct competition was involved, but the trial court
dismissed the complaint because there was no evidence that the defendant
would enter the Greely market except by acquisition, and no evidence
showing the defendant had any present influence on the competitive market in Greely.86
In the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the case, and
the dismissal below was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Presumably, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, dissenters in Falstaff, 7 were for affirmance, and were joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
(who along with Powell made the majority in the next potential competition case);8 8 Justices White, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall presumably
were for reversing.
89
United7 States
Marine Bancorporation
involved
a challenge second
under
section
by the v.
government
to the acquisition
by Washington's
83. 410 U.S. at 531-32 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 537. On remand, the district court dismissed the complaint, finding Falstaff
was not a potential competitor. 383 F. Supp. 1020 (D.R.I. 1974).
85. 329 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Colo. 1971), ard by an equally divided court, 410 U.S. 577
(1973).
86. 329 F. Supp. at 1015.
87. 410 U.S. 526, 572 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. See notes 90-94 and accompanying text infra.
89. 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,496 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 31, 1973), aJJ'd, 418 U.S. 602
(1974).
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largest banking organization, headquartered in Seattle, of the second largest bank in Spokane. Washington law prohibited branching into any
town, other than a bank's headquarters, where another bank had an office.
The only route for expansion into a town where there was a preexisting
bank was by acquisition. The trial court dismissed the case, holding that
the government had failed to prove any anticompetitive effects.9"
The Supreme Court affirmed, with the "new antitrust majority," (in the
words of Justice White in dissent),9 refusing to apply the traditional potential competition doctrine to the facts of this case.92 The majority held
that the relevant market was commercial banking in the Spokane area and
not statewide, and that the proper geographic market was the area in
which the acquired firm was an actual, direct competitor. The Court held
that the potential competition doctrine is applicable to commercial banking, but that the unique federal and state regulatory restraints on entry into
the commercial banking market must be considered. The government's
failure to recognize these restraints on entry into this market and its attempt to treat banking like beer amounted to a misconception of the potential competition doctrine, according to the Court.93 The dissenters,
Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall, accused the "new antitrust majority" of chipping away at the policies of section 7 and redefining the elements of potential competition, greatly increasing the burden of
establishing a section 7 violation.9 4
UnitedStates v. Connecticut National Bank" was decided the same day
as the previous case, by essentially the same alignment of Justices. In that
case, the government challenged the acquisition by the fourth largest bank
in Connecticut, headquartered in Bridgeport, of the eighth largest bank,
headquartered in New Haven. Under Connecticut law, one bank may not
branch into any town containing the main office of another bank. Since
there was no direct competition, the government relied on the potential
competition theory and claimed the entire state was an appropriate market
in which to review this merger. The district court dismissed the case.96
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that commercial banking was the
product market, but the relevant geographic market was the localized area
90. 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,496, supra note 89, at 94,251.
91. 418 U.S. at 643 (White, J., dissenting).
92. See id at 625-41. While the majority did apply the potential competition doctrine
to the case, it nonetheless found that the doctrine had little effect in the commercial banking
setting where state regulations impose stringent barriers to entries into new markets. Id
93. Id at 627-29.
94. Id. at 642 (White, J., dissenting).
95. 362 F. Supp. 240 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
96. 362 F. Supp. 240.
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in which the acquired bank is in significant, direct competition with other
banks, albeit not with the acquiring bank. Accordingly, there was no appropriate statewide market, and the trial court would have to determine
the competitive effect of this merger in localized areas where each bank
had its offices. 97
Where does this leave the potential competition doctrine? Justice White,
who wrote the Falstaff opinion defining much of that doctrine, thinks the
"new antitrust majority" of the Court has limited that doctrine and made it
much more difficult to establish a section 7 violation, absent direct competition between the parties. 98 Certainly the doctrine seems to be very restricted in its application to bank mergers. True, state regulations in the
area vary wildly and have some bearing on how realistically a concern is
viewed as a potential entrant into a market and, as such, exercises a competitive effect on that market. But this series of opinions seems to have
removed from practical consideration statewide geographic markets.
The only other Supreme Court opinion in a section 7 case filed in the
last decade came in United States v. Citizens & Southern NationalBank. 99
The government challenged the acquisition by Citizens & Southern, Georgia's largest bank organization, of five suburban Atlanta banks. These had
been established as de facto branches, Citizens & Southern owning five
percent of the stock and the balance held in friendly hands. The purpose
of the holding arrangement was to circumvent Georgia law restricting city
banks' attempts to open suburban branches. In 1970, Georgia changed
this law, and Citizens & Southern then sought to absorb the suburban
banks and make them true branches. The trial court dismissed the case on
the ground that the suburban banks had always been defacto branches,
and the stock acquisition by Citizens & Southern that was now permissible
under state law had no anticompetitive effect." The Supreme Court affirmed, since the acquisition extinguished no present competition (there
never had been any) and there was no realistic prospect of any future competition developing. 0O
97. 418 U.S. at 667, 671. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. 418 U.S. 656. The dissent
was by Justice White, joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall. Id. at 673 (White, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). On remand, the banks abandoned the merger and the
case was dismissed.
98. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 654 (White, J., dissenting).
99. 372 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Ga. 1974), affid, 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
100. See 372 F. Supp. at 642-43.
101. 422 U.S. at 121. The government had also contended that the arrangement between
Citizens & Southern and the suburban banks violated § I of the Sherman Act, but the Court
ruled to the contrary. 422 U.S. at 119-20.
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A somewhat similar factual situation had been presented several years
earlier in UnitedStates v. Trans Texas Bancorporation,Inc. 102 A group of
individuals owned controlling stock in a large downtown El Paso bank and
they set up three suburban banks, holding stock control of each. At that
time Texas law did not permit branching at all. The trial court held that
there was no competition between these banks, and accordingly their acquisition by a bank holding company did not eliminate competition and so
did not violate section 7.1°3 The Supreme Court summarily affirmed.'° 4
On November 14, 1973, three bank merger cases were filed in Detroit
challenging acquisitions of banks in East Lansing, Saginaw, and Grand
Rapids by Michigan's largest bank outside Detroit. °5 Because of the
mechanics by which these acquisitions were planned, they required the approval of both the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency. The former gave approval but before the latter acted, the United
States filed the three cases. The trial court dismissed each as premature,
since the mergers could not occur absent the Comptroller's approval. The
United States appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed per curiam.
Some two years later all three cases were terminated by dismissal of the
Saginaw and Grand Rapids cases and in the East Lansing case by the entry of a consent judgment requiring the divestiture of the bank in that city
and enjoining future acquisitions in the Saginaw and Grand Rapids areas. 106
Little needs to be said about the remaining bank merger cases filed in
the last decade. The Bennington, Vermont, "area" was held not to be too
insignificant for section 7 purposes.'0 7 Another Colorado bank merger
case was dismissed following the Supreme Court's action in Greely discussed above.' 0 8 In most of the other cases, the suits were dismissed after
102. 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH)
946 (1973).
103. Id

74,257 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 1972), affrdmem., 412 U.S.

104. 412 U.S. 946 (1973). Justices Brennan, White and Marshall would have noted probable jurisdiction.
105. United States v. Michigan Nat'i Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,928 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 19, 1974), vacated and remandedpercuriam, 419 U.S. 1(1974); 1976-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 61,101 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 1976) (consent decree).
106. See §§ IV & VI of the consent decree, 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,101, at 69,982-

83.
107. United States v. County Nat'l Bank of Bennington, 339 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. Vt.
1972).
108. United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder]
REG. REP. (CCH) 45,070 (Case No. 2141) (D. Colo. June 1, 1973). See notes 85-88
and accompanying text supra.
TRADE
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the merger was abandoned; occasionally the merger was allowed to stand
but injunctive provisions prohibited other acquisitions.
Two cases, United States v. County National Bancorporation' 0 9 and
United States v. United Virginia Bancshares, Inc. ,1" went against the government on the issue of geographic market. In both, the courts held the
government was seeking to define too narrow a market. In a field related
to banking, two cases challenged acquisitions by Beneficial Corporation of
substantial finance companies. The actions were terminated by consent
judgments requiring the divestiture of various local offices in cities where
concentration in this business was most pronounced."' In a similar case,
challenging the acquisition by Household Finance Co. of an independent
consumer finance company, the trial court held that personal loans by
finance companies did not constitute a separate line of commerce. The
appellate court reversed."12
The nonbank merger cases filed in the seventies produced no interesting
law, but some of the complaints deserve brief mention. Two suits were
filed against United Technologies Corp., alleging that its tender offers for
Babcock & Wilcox and for Carrier Corporation violated section 7. United
States v. United Technologies Corp. (Babcock & Wilcox) "' involved
equipment for the generation of power by utilities. United Technologies
produced gas turbines and Babcock & Wilcox produced fossil fuel and
nuclear systems. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that the two
types of equipment were not in the same product market. In United States
v. United Technologies Corp. (Carrier),' 4 the Carrier acquisition involved
competition in heating and air conditioning equipment and in magnet
wire. This case was settled by a consent judgment requiring United Technologies to make certain trade secrets and patents available to competitors.
Acquisitions by conglomerates, of course, raise many complex problems
under section 7, such as market definition as in the United Technologies
(Babcock & Wilcox) case above, or partial overlap of various subordinate
109.

355 F. Supp. 538 (E.D. Mo. 1973).

110. 347 F. Supp. 891 (E.D. Va. 1972).
111. United States v. Beneficial Corp., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,137 (N.D. IlL. Dec.
17, 1979); United States v. Beneficial Corp., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,136 (N.D. I11.
Dec. 17, 1979).
112. United States v. Household Fin. Corp., 602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
113. 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,647 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 1977).
114. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,767 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1980) (proposed consent
decree).
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fields. United States v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 5 a suit based on a
tender offer by Occidental for Mead Corporation, illustrates this problem.
Occidental, then the twenty-seventh largest industrial corporation in the
country, was in a wide variety of business activities here and abroad. It
was this country's twelfth largest oil company, the tenth largest chemical
producer, and the fourth largest coal company. Mead was the 138th largest company, with primary emphasis on forest products. It was the fifth
largest pulp and paper company; a major producer of chemicals, coal, iron
castings, and molded rubber products; a distributor of numerous supplies
for the oil and gas industries; and the largest supplier of computerized legal research systems. The complaint charged, in three counts, the lessening
of competition in sodium chlorate, in carbonless copy paper, and in prime
coking coal. On March 29, 1979, the Court dismissed the complaint after
Occidental abandoned the acquisition.
An interesting new pleading format is illustrated in Occidental Petroleum where the government's complaint is divided into separate counts
alleging section 7 violations in separate markets. Earlier section 7 pleadings were not divided in this way and tended to delineate the affected markets only in describing the effects of the challenged merger. While the
practice of alleging various counts in the complaint does, in fact, separate
the markets in which the effects of the merger are to be evaluated, such a
procedure tends to under-emphasize the anticompetitive impact of the
merger of two giant corporations, even though direct competition in any
field may be minimal. It is instructive to compare the allegations of the
three counts in Occidental Petroleum, which each involve substantial but
hardly fundamental and basic economic markets, with the allegations contained in the complaint filed in United States v. Ling-Temco- Vought,
Inc. i16 which challenged LTV's acquisition of Jones & Laughlin Steel:
The effect of the acquisition. . . may be to substantially lessen
competition . . . in the following ways:

Potential independent competition by LTV and J & L Steel
may be diminished in the steel industry, in other markets in
which only one of them presently competes, and in certain other
markets in which neither of them presently competes;
Concentration of control of manufacturing assets will be sub115.
(W.D.
116.
(W.D.

[1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
Ohio Oct. 11, 1978).
[1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
Pa. May 27, 1971).

45,078 (Case No. 2668)
45,070 (Case No. 2045)
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stantially increased." 7
Pleading the section 7 violation in various counts each limited to a relatively narrow market might pose a serious question if one of the parties
abandoned each of the specified markets: whether the merger would still
violate section 7 by combining two giant concerns, increasing sheer size,
and certainly increasing the "concentration of control of manufacturing
assets."
The Mead Corporation was a defendant in United States v. British Columbia ForestProducts,Ltd ,18 filed on August 17, 1978. The complaint
alleged a violation of section 7 in the market for coated groundwood papers which resulted from an acquisition of a Minnesota paper company by
a company jointly controlled by Mead and a Canadian corporation.
Emerson Electric's acquisition of fifty percent of the stock of Skil Corporation was challenged as violating section 7. In United States v. Emerson
Electric Co. ,119 a five count complaint was settled by a consent judgment
providing for certain divestiture and other relief. Acquisitions by International Nickel Co., by Merck & Co., by Martin-Marietta, by White Consolidated Industries, and by Combustion Engineering also were challenged,
decrees in the first three of these cases providing for certain divestiture or
other injunctive relief.'2 °
One interesting variant occurred in United States v. Hercules, Inc. 121
where the government charged that Hercules and a Japanese partner violated section 7 by the formation of a partnership through which each of the
117. See 33 of the complaint in Case No. 2045, filed April 14, 1969 in the Western
District of Pennsylvania.
118. [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 45,078 (Case No. 2650) (D.
Minn. Aug. 17, 1978).
119. United States v. Emerson Elec. Co., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,336 (N.D. Ill.
1980). Involved were the markets in portable electric tools, gasoline chain saws, and various
other sub-markets.
120. United States v. Merck & Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 63,682 (S.D. Cal. Dec.
1, 1980); United States v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,109 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 14, 1979); United States v. Inco Ltd., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,869 (E.D. Pa.

Jan. 27, 1978); United States v. White Consol. Indus., 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971)
(preliminary injunction restraining merger); United States v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., [19701979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case No. 2641) (D. Conn. May
10, 1978). In addition, Combustion Engineering was the defendant in two earlier cases challenging acquisitions in the fields of industrial boilers and pulp and paper machinery. A
consent decree requiring divestiture was entered in the boiler case, United States v. Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,648 (D. Conn. Sept. 8, 1971), motion forfurlher
relief denied, 364 F. Supp. 181 (D. Conn. 1972). The pulp and paper case was dismissed
without prejudice, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,070 (Case.
No. 2129) (D. Conn. Jan. 1, 1974).
121. 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,530 (D. Del, Jul. 3, 1973).
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partners acquired from the other patents relating to polypropylene. A consent judgment dissolved the partnership and restricted the exchange of
technology.
Not all the section 7 cases filed in the seventies involved major companies or basic economic markets. Cases challenged mergers in the fields of
artificial Christmas trees, all-beef casing frankfurters, and frozen dessert
pies."2 The other cases filed in this period involved a great variety of
companies, markets and products. Most of these cases were terminated
either by consent judgments requiring some divestiture together with other
appropriate injunctive relief, or by dismissal when the merger was abandoned.
The cases lost by the government turned on a variety of issues. In several, the court disagreed with the government on its definition of relevant
product market, and found the two concerns to be in separate markets. On
occasion, the court accepted a failing company defense, 2 3 or found that a
regulatory agency had primary jurisdiction over the acquisition. In some,
the trial court held the government had failed to prove any anticompetitive
effects of the merger.
During the decade of the seventies, four cases were filed charging an
interlock of a director in violation of section 8, and one other case primarily under section 7 also alleged a section 8 violation. Two of the section 8
cases involved an individual acting as a director of two companies in the
oil and gas industry. Foster Bam was a director of both Cities Service, a
major oil company, and of American Natural Gas, a major pipeline company. The two companies were alleged to compete in seeking oil and gas
producing properties. A consent decree required Mr. Barn to resign from
American Natural Gas.' 24 Marsh Cooper was a director of both Superior
Oil and Texas Eastern Transmission, which allegedly competed in obtaining oil and gas properties. A consent judgment terminated the interlock. 125
122. See United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,606 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 28, 1977); United States v. American Technical Indus., Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 75,376 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 1974); United States v. Marathon Enterprises, Inc., [19701979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,072 (Case No. 2296) (D.N.J. Dec. 14,
1972).
123. This is a doctrine developed by the courts to the effect that if the acquired company
is very likely to fail and if there is no other realistic purchaser, then the acquisition does not
lessen competition and so is not a § 7 violation. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States,
394 U.S. 131, 136-39 (1969).
124. United States v. Bam, 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,734 (D. Conn. Feb. 5, 1976).
125. United States v. Cooper, 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,952 (S.D. Tex. June 24,
1976).
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More interesting are two cases filed in San Francisco alleging that a person serving as a director both of a bank and of an insurance company
violated section 8. The government charged that banks and insurance
companies competed in offering certain forms of credit, but the court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that
this type of interlock is not covered by section 8.126
The United States v. Cleveland Trust Co. 27 case is perhaps the most
interesting of all. The case alleged a section 7 violation because the defendant owned substantial stock in four major machine tool manufacturers. The court granted summary judgment for the defendant on this part
of the case on the ground of mootness since some of the overlapping businesses had been sold. A consent judgment was entered, however, which
dealt with the section 8 allegations and forbade any employees of the defendant bank from serving as directors of competing firms, even though it
was not the same individual who was on the two boards. 2 ' These provisions appear to bear out the theory that the defendant bank, acting
through its agents, is the director, and that the individual serving as a director is really only an agent of the bank and acts for the bank.
This theory should be compared with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Blau v. Lehman.'29 In that case, suit was brought to recover short-swing
profits under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,130
which permits recovery by a company of profits made by one of its directors from the purchase and sale within six months of the company's securities. The director involved was a partner of Lehman Brothers, a major
Wall Street securities firm. The majority of the Court declined to hold that
the individual partner had been deputized by Lehman to "perform a director's duties not for himself but for Lehman,"' 3'' basing its decision on the
factual context of the particular case and the legislative history of section
126. United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The first
case alleged three separate interlocks with Crocker Nat'l Bank and Metropolitan Life, with
Crocker Bank and Equitable Life and with Crocker Bank and Mutual Life. The second case
alleged interlocks between Prudential Insurance Co. and Bank of America, and between
Prudential and Banker's Trust. Even though the court granted summary judgment, several
of the individuals involved already had entered consent decree arrangements. United States
v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,857 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1976); United
States v. BankAmerica Corp., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,095 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 1976).
They were not involved in the summary judgment motion.
127. 392 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975).
128. United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,611 (N.D.
Ohio Nov. 14, 1975).
129. 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
130. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
131. 368 U.S. at 410.
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16(b). The consent judgment in Cleveland Trust 132 certainly follows the
theory of Justice Douglas' dissent, 33 and regards the bank itself as the
director acting as it must through agents.
Nine of the cases filed in the seventies were brought primarily under
section 4A of the Clayton Act, permitting the government to recover actual
damages to its business or property suffered because of a violation of the
antitrust laws. The government almost invariably seeks to recover as well
under the False Claims Act 134 which allows for recovery of double damages.' 35 None of these cases led to any opinion at the trial or appellate
level on any issues relating to section 4A. Substantial damages were
agreed to in the settlement of some of these cases, and others are still pending.
Two related cases deserve special mention.' 36 Both cases charged the
defendants with allocating contracts and rigging bids to the United States
Department of Agriculture for corn, soybeans, milk products, and fortified
sorghum grits, purchased for the Food for Peace Program, in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, leading to claims for damages under section
4A and the False Claims Act.' 3 7 Final consent decrees in the civil cases
have been entered, and one company,
a defendant in both cases, agreed to
138
pay $2,750,000 as damages.
During the seventies, seven civil contempt actions were initiated. One
case is still unresolved, one case was settled, and in two others the government was unsuccessful. 139 Of the remaining three actions, one grew out of
132. See note 127 supra.
133. 368 U.S. at 414 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
134. 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-233, 235 (1976).
135. One of the nine cases was brought solely under the False Claims Act. United States
v. Arcole Midwest Corp., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 45,079
(Case No. 2709) (N.D. I11.June 18, 1978).
136. United States v. Lauhoff Grain Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REQ. REP.
(CCH) 45,078 (Case Nos. 2627-2628) (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1978); United States v. Krause
Milling Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case Nos.
2629-30) (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1978).
137. Id
138. United States v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 63,643 (D. Kan.
Nov. 3, 1980); United States v. Krause Milling Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,991 (D.
Kan. Sept. 20, 1979).
139. Still unresolved is United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,079 (Case No. 2726) (W.D. Mo. Oct. 1, 1979).
The contempt action against Associated Milk Producers, Inc., was dismissed as moot after
the co-op agreed to end the practices which led the government to seek the contempt order.
United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Mo. 1979). In
United States v. Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Mo. 1972), the
court held there was no violation of the prior decree. In United States v. Martin Linen
Supply, Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REQ. REP. (CCH) 45,071 (Case No.
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a civil case filed against Work Wear Corporation under section 7 of the
Clayton Act which was terminated by a consent judgment requiring certain divestiture. 140 On July 1, 1975, the government filed a civil contempt
petition to compel the divestiture. After an extension of time was
granted,141 the court finally imposed a fine of $5,000 per day starting January 1, 1977, until the defendant divested the property. By the middle of
1979, divestiture had still not occurred, and the fine had mounted to more
than $1 million. The Court of Appeals held that this was not an abuse of
discretion. 42 In two other cases the court43 found the defendant in civil
contempt and entered appropriate orders.'
This review of the Clayton Act cases of the last decade suggests that the
Act is becoming less important in the enforcement of antitrust, since the
number of cases is diminishing, and only occasionally does a case involve
a merger of the kind that contributes to the undue concentration of economic power. Bank merger cases have lost almost all of their former significance, and, of course, sections 8 and 4A are of relatively little
importance.
III.

CRIMINAL CASES

During the decade of the 1970s, the government filed 240 criminal cases,
or thirty-seven percent of the total number of cases filed in that period.
About eighty percent' 44 of the criminal cases were terminated by the entry
of pleas of nolo contendere or guilty, with a relatively small number of
cases going to trial. Many of the trials resulted in acquittals for some defendants, however it is clear that the number of criminal defendants acquitted was very small in relation to the total number of defendants named
inall the 240 cases.
I
The Sherman Act has always contained criminal sanctions for its violation, but from its enactment in 1890 to 1955, the violation was a misde2201) (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 1971), the civil contempt petition was dismissed after a related
criminal case had resulted in an acquittal.
140. United States v. Work Wear Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73-681 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 27, 1971).
141. United States v. Work Wear Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,431 (N.D. Ohio
Aug. 15, 1975).
142. United States v. Work Wear Corp., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,437 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 19, 1977), aft'd, 602 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1979).
143. United States v. American Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, 446 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
1973), af d, 508 F.2d 529 (7th
United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. I11.
Cir. 1974). See note 63 supra.
144. It is not feasible to calculate a precise figure since most cases named multiple defendants, some of whom would plead, while others would stand trial.
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meanor subject to a $5,000 fine and one year in jail. In 1955, the fine was
increased to $50,000. 145 A dramatic change in the penalties was made in
1974 when violations were made felonies, the jail term was increased to
three years, and the fines increased to $1 million for a corporate defendant
and $100,000 for an individual. 46 This legislative change was undoubtedly responsible for a different approach by both prosecutors and courts to
the Sherman Act as a criminal statute.
147
Table IV shows details by years of the criminal cases filed.
Little antitrust law was made by these criminal cases, and there was only
one Supreme Court opinion of any significance. In UnitedStates v. United
States Gypsum Co. ,141 six major manufacturers of gypsum wall board were
indicted for allegedly fixing prices. Four went to trial and after nineteen
weeks of testimony, the jury found them guilty. The Third Circuit reversed on the ground that the trial judge's instructions regarding intent
were erroneous. Other issues raised by the defendants concerning a meeting between the trial judge and the jury foreman and concerning instruc145. Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 281, 69 Stat. 282 (amended 1974).
146. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
147. The non-Sherman Act criminal cases covered a wide range of criminal charges,
often filed in conjunction with Sherman Act charges. See, e.g., United States v. VSL Corp.,
[1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,079 (Case No. 2727) (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 8, 1979) (mail fraud); United States v. Watson, and United States v. Reeves, [19701979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 45,079 (Case Nos. 2703, 2702) (E.D. Mo.
May 18, 1979) (making false statements to a grand jury); United States v. Smejkal, [19701979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,079 (Case No. 2689) (D. Or. Jan. 25,
1979) (mail fraud); United States v. Scrimgeor, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REQ.
REP. (CCH) 745,079 (Case No. 2685) (S.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 1979) (false statements to a grand
jury); United States v. Twentieth Century-Fox, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case No. 2653) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1978) (criminal contempt); United
States v. Tobey, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case No.
2648) (C.D. III. Aug. 4, 1978) (false statements to a grand jury); United States v. Treadway,
1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,937 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 1978) (obstruction of justice); United
States v. Rastelli, 551 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 831 (1977) (racketeering); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 45,072 (Case Nos. 2271-2272) (W.D. Mo. Aug. 14, 1972) (violation of federal firearms law).
148. 550 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977) (convictions reversed and cases remanded for new trials), aft'd, 438 U.S. 422 (1978), denial of motionfor acquittalaf d, 600 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979). Six major manufacturers of gypsum board, and 10
individuals connected with the companies were named as defendants. In January 1975, two
corporations and seven individuals pleaded nolo contendere, 550 F.2d at 118, n.4. Maximum
fines of $50,000 each were imposed on the corporations, and the individuals were fined from
$20,000 to $40,000 and received suspended sentences of one to six months. The remaining
four corporate and three individual defendants went to trial.
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tions about withdrawal from the conspiracy were found to be grounds for
reversal by only one member of the three-judge panel.149 The Supreme
Court affirmed.
The main and most interesting part of Chief Justice Burger's opinion
dealt with the question of intent in Sherman Act cases, and seems to have
contributed substantial confusion to an area of law already unclear. The
gypsum board industry was oligopolistic, fifteen producers turning out a
fungible product and eight of them accounting for ninety-four percent of
the business. The price-fixing charge of the indictment was based on interseller price verification, the practice allegedly followed by the manufacturers of phoning a competitor to determine the price currently being offered
to a specific customer. The government argued these price exchanges had
the effect of stabilizing prices and policing agreed upon price increases.
149. 550 F.2d 115, 130-34 (Adams, J., concurring).
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The defendants claimed any price exchanges were for the purpose of complying with the Robinson-Patman Act's prohibition of price discrimination
and establishing a defense of good-faith meeting of competition sanctioned
under section 2(b) of the Clayton Act.' 5 °
The trial judge instructed the jury that if it found the interseller price
verification program had been undertaken "in a good faith effort to comply with the Robinson-Patman Act," then such verification alone would be
insufficient to establish a price-fixing agreement. The judge continued that
the law presumes that a person intends the necessary and natural consequences of his acts, and therefore if the effect of the exchange of pricing
information was to fix and stabilize prices, the defendants "are presumed,
as a matter of law, to have intended that result."'' The Court of Appeals
held this charge to be reversible error, believing that the price verification
program, if adopted to establish a defense to price discrimination charges,
would be excused from a Sherman Act attack as occurring under a "controlling circumstance" under the rationale of United States v. Container
Corporation of America. "'
The Supreme Court decision ignored much of the circuit court's approach, but agreed that this part of the charge was error:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that an effect on prices, without more, will not support a criminal conviction under the Sherman Act, but we do not base that conclusion on the existence of
any conflict between the requirements of the Robinson-Patman
and the Sherman Acts. Rather, we hold that a defendant's state
of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense
which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn
therefrom and cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of wrongful intent from proof of an
effect on prices. Since the challenged instruction, as we read it,
had this prohibited effect, it is disapproved. We are unwilling to
construe the Sherman Act as mandating a regime of strict-liability criminal offenses.' 53
150. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).
151. 438 U.S. at 429-30.
152. 393 U.S. 333 (1969). In Gypsum the Third Circuit stated that the Supreme Court
"has drawn a narrow line" in deciding data dissemination cases, because in competitive
markets information exchanges promote competition, while in oligolopolistic markets such
exchanges depress competition. 550 F.2d at 122. "Where the information exchange occurs
under a 'controlling circumstance,' such as the purpose of preventing fraud in Cement Manufacturers [Cement Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925)], the exchange can be
upheld under the Sherman Act, despite a proven or presumed effect on price." 550 F.2d at
123 (footnote omitted).
153. 438 U.S. at 435-36 (citations omitted).
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The Court went on to review the common law concept of intent being an
essential element of a crime, and said that since the Sherman Act is not a
strict liability statute punishment would not be fitting absent an appropriate state of mind. The Court apparently sought to draw a distinction between the civil and criminal sanctions provided in the Sherman Act, and
said that since the Sherman Act is vague and imprecise, criminal enforcement requires an intent:
With certain exceptions for conduct regarded asper se illegal
because of its unquestionably anticompetitive effects, the behavior proscribed by the Act is often difficult to distinguish from the
gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justifiable
business conduct. Indeed, the type of conduct charged in the indictment in this case-the exchange of price information among
competitors-is illustrative in this regard. The imposition of
criminal liability on a corporate official, or for that matter on a
corporation directly, for engaging in such conduct which only after the fact is determined to violate the statute because of anticompetitive effects, without inquiring into the intent with which
it was undertaken, holds out the distinct possibility of overdeterrence. . . . Further, the use of criminal sanctions in such circumstances would be difficult to square with the generally accepted
functions of the criminal law. . . . The criminal sanctions would
be used, not to punish conscious and calculated wrongdoing at
odds with statutory proscriptions, but instead simply to regulate
business practices
regardless of the intent with which they were
54
undertaken. 1
The Court then reviewed the generally accepted standards or levels of
intent, found that the concepts of recklessness or negligence have no place
in antitrust decisions, and concluded:
Our question instead is whether a criminal violation of the
antitrust laws requires, in addition to proof of anticompetitive effects, a demonstration that the disputed conduct was undertaken
with the "conscious object" of producing such effects, or whether
it is sufficient that the conduct is shown to have been undertaken
with knowledge that the proscribed effects would most likely follow. While the difference between these formulations is a narrow
one, we conclude that action undertaken with knowledge of its
probable consequences and having the requisite anticompetitive
effects can be a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal liability under the antitrust laws.' 55
154. Id at 440-42 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis in the original).
155. Id. at 444 (citations omitted).
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The Court considered in some detail whether verification of price concessions for the sole purpose of taking advantage of the meeting competition defense of the Robinson-Patman Act should be treated as a
"controlling circumstance" precluding liability under the Sherman Act,
and concluded that the circuit court's analysis of this point was "unacceptable."' 56 Of course, this had been the main thrust of the Circuit Court's
decision. The Supreme Court ruled out a "controlling circumstance" exas a
ception to the ban on price-fixing for interseller price verification
157
means of facilitating compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act.
At the conclusion of the trial in this case, and after the jury had been
sequestered for six days deliberating, the foreman had a meeting with the
judge alone to discuss the state of the jury. Apparently, counsel consented
to this meeting with some reluctance. The Supreme Court held this could
constitute reversible error, since despite perfect good faith the other jurors
hear only from their foreman, and the chances for misunderstanding are
very substantial. It appeared in this case that the foreman may have misunderstood some words of the judge as insisting on a verdict one way or
The
the other, since the jury returned its verdict the next morning.'
Court also found too narrow the trial judge's charge on withdrawal from
the conspiracy.159
Apparently, the Supreme Court has taken the position that a Sherman
Act conviction requires some element of intent. Proof of intent, however,
does not require proof of a conscious desire to achieve the objective but
can be satisfied if the trier of fact infers from the evidence that the defendants knew that their actions would, in the normal and natural course of
events, result in the objective being realized. Yet the Court held that the
trial judge committed reversible error in charging the jury that as a matter
of law the defendants are presumed to have intended the natural results of
their actions, and so to have intended to fix prices, if they knew their price
information exchanges would lead to fixing and stabilizing prices. The
trial lasted about five months; the judge's charge covered forty pages of the
record; the jury deliberated six days.' 60 One wonders what human juror,
under such circumstances, could appreciate the distinctions the various
members of the court find so significant. 161
156. Id at 447-53.
157. Id at 458-59.
158. Id at 459-62.
159. The trial judge charged that withdrawal could be demonstrated only by notice to all
other conspirators or disclosure to law enforcement officials. The Supreme Court said conduct inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy could be considered. Id at 463-65.
160. See id at 428-33, 471 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion, joined entirely by Justices Brennan, Mar-
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The Third Circuit has had two occasions to consider Gypsum in subsequent antitrust litigation. In UnitedStates v. Gillen 6 2 the defendant, president of a major coal company, was convicted of price fixing by the trial
court sitting without a jury. Representatives of various coal companies
had regularly met and set prices for coal and the timing of price changes
and Gillen regularly received reports from his company's representative at
the price-fixing meetings. Because the trial judge had made no specific
findings as to intent, the guilty verdict was attacked on appeal. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Gypsum did not basically alter the law for
price-fixing cases. The appellate court pointed out that Gypsum was not a
direct price-fix, where the parties specifically set prices, but was an exchange of price information the result of which was to stabilize prices. The
Gillen conduct was in no sense ambiguous or approaching any "gray
zone." According to the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court did not change
the law or impose any new burden of proof inper se cases, and no inquiry
need be made on the issue of intent, beyond proof that a defendant joined
the conspiracy; "the mere existence of a price-fixing agreement establishes
163
a defendant's illegal purpose."'
One member of the court, while concurring in the judgment, disagreed
with the majority's interpretation of Gypsum, believing that even inper se
cases the government must prove intent, at least in the sense that defendant had knowledge of the probable consequences of his acts, and this
knowledge must be established by evidence or inferences therefrom and
64
not by presumptions of law.'
A few months later, another three-judge panel of the same court considered a similar issue and reached the same result. 65 The majority affirmed
a conviction by a jury in a straight price-fixing case under instructions that
to convict the government must prove the defendants had knowingly
joined a conspiracy to fix prices. The majority followed Gillen, saying that
shall and White. Justice Blackmun did not participate in the case. Justices Rehnquist and
Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. Justices Stewart and Powell separately
joined invarious parts of the Burger opinion. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
162. 458 F. Supp. 887 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aft'd, 599 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 866 (1979).

163. 599 F.2d at 545.
164. Id at 548-49 (Adams, J., concurring).
165. United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 456 F. Supp.

704 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aft'd,

603 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980). Five corporate manufacturers of consumer bags and seven individuals were named as defendants; some entered nolo
pleas, others were acquitted, and two corporations and two individuals were found guilty.
They appealed and the Third Circuit affirmed. The trial court had levied fines of $750,000
and $600,000 on the two corporations, and jail terms of four months with fines of $40,000
and $30,000 on the two individuals. 603 F.2d at 447.
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the crucial distinction between Gypsum and Gillen was that "[a]n agreement to exchange prices, by itself, is not illegal; an agreement to fix prices
is. ' One member of the panel, while concurring, argued that Gypsum
required for conviction proof that a defendant specifically intended to produce anticompetitive effects, or proof that he knew anticompetitive effects
probably result from his conduct and evidence that such effects took
would 67
1
place.
A Seventh Circuit opinion is very similar. In United States v. Brighton
Building & Maintenance Co. ,168 that court affirmed a jury conviction of
numerous defendants accused of rigging bids to the state of Illinois. The
trial judge had charged that to convict, the jury must find defendants were
"knowingly and intentionally" members of the conspiracy and that it was
not necessary to find a specific intent to violate the law, for the defendants
"are deemed to have intended the necessary and direct consequences of
their acts."' 169 The appellate court believed these instructions required the
jury to find the defendants intentionally agreed to form a combination for
the purpose of rigging bids and allocating contracts, and that this satisfied
the test laid down by Gypsum, since bid-rigging is a per se offense. The
court said that the jury need not be instructed that it must find an intent to
restrain trade in order to convict; it is sufficient if the defendants knowingly formed the combination to rig bids and intentionally assisted in carrying out the agreement.' 7 °
Another case in which the defendants sought to rely on Gypsum was the
Maryland private brand gasoline case, UnitedStates v. Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of America (SIGMA) . 17 1 The indictment alleged
that seven oil companies, their association and four individuals conspired
to fix prices for private brand gasoline and in carrying out the conspiracy
used SIGMA as a clearinghouse for gasoline pricing information in order
to coordinate price increases and to eliminate discounting and settle pricing disputes. After they were convicted by the jury the association and five
of the oil companies relied on Gypsum in their appeal, claiming they were
convicted for exchanging information on prices. The Fourth Circuit, how166. 603 F.2d at 462 (footnote omitted).

167. Id at 468 (Hunter, J., concurring).
168. 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979), affirming convictions of nine contracting firms and two individuals charged with one count of violating the
Sherman Act, 37 counts of mail fraud and two counts of racketeering. One corporate defendant pleaded guilty; at trial one other corporate defendant was acquitted; and all other
defendants were found guilty on all counts. 598 F.2d at 1103.
169. 598 F.2d at 1104.
170. Id at 1106.
171. 624 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1979).
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ever, found this case unlike Gypsum, since here the defendants were
charged with a conspiracy to fix prices and the exchange of information
was merely one way in which the price fixing was effectuated. The court
said that since price fixing is illegalperse, no inquiry as to intent or effect
is necessary since "the mere existence of a price-fixing agreement estab72
lishes the defendants' illegal purpose."'
The Supreme Court handed down only one other opinion in any of the
criminal cases initiated in the seventies, and that opinion had nothing to
do with antitrust law. A consent judgment entered in a prior case enjoined
certain Texas linen supply firms from threatening other suppliers to induce
them not to serve defendants' customers. In 1971, the government filed a
criminal contempt petition, alleging that the defendants were violating that
provision; the trial judge dismissed the case but was reversed by the court
of appeals. The government filed a new petition and eventually the trial
court entered a judgment of acquittal after a jury was unable to reach a
verdict. Under such circumstances, does the government have a right to
appeal? The Fifth Circuit said no and the Supreme Court agreed, holding
that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy prevented any
73
appeal by the government. 1
Of the criminal proceedings filed in the seventies, twelve other cases
reached appellate courts. The Ninth Circuit had no trouble in finding a
boycott to be aperse violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act in United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp. 174 In that case, four Portland, Oregon hotels,
an association, and some individuals were charged with forcing suppliers
172. Id at 465. The jury acquitted two corporate and three individual defendants and
convicted all others. Id at 463. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction of two of the
companies, reversed the conviction of one corporation because it had been denied access to
hospital records needed to cross examine a witness, and reversed the conviction of an individual on the ground that he had been granted immunity. Id at 469.
173. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 485 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974), decision after remand, 534 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1976), aI'd, 430 U.S.
564 (1977). A companion civil contempt petition was also filed. The trial judge dismissed
the criminal petition, on the ground that the conduct alleged in the petition did not violate
the earlier judgment. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. 485 F.2d at 1144. On retrial, the jury acquitted the individual defendant and was unable to agree as to the two
corporate defendants. The trial judge, characterizing this as the weakest contempt case he
had ever seen, entered judgment of acquittal. 534 F.2d at 587. The circuit court dismissed
the government's appeal on the ground it had no jurisdiction. Id The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the Constitution prevented the government from appealing from
an acquittal in such circumstances. 430 U.S. at 575-76.
174. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973). Most of the defendants pleaded nolo contendere, but Western International Hotels and two individuals went to trial; a jury acquitted the individuals but found
the corporation guilty, and the circuit court affirmed.
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to the hotels, by threats of withholding purchases, to contribute one percent of their hotel sales to the association in an effort to attract conventions
to the city. The appeals court held this conduct was clearly aperse violation, even though price, service, and quality were not affected and the ultimate objective was to bring conventions to Portland.'7 5 Since the primary
purpose and direct effect of the defendants' agreement was to bring the
combined economic power of the hotels to bear on the suppliers who failed
to pay, the court thought this was a very clear per se violation.' 76 The
same court, in United States v. Manufacturers'Association of the Relocatable Building Industry,17 gave short shrift to a contention that the per se
rule created a conclusive presumption thereby denying defendants due
process. A jury convicted the defendants of agreeing not to reduce bids nor
to rebid for sixty days. The defendants argued the per se rule was an impermissible conclusive presumption denying them their right to a jury determination of each element of the offense. The court said theper se rule
merely defines certain classes of pernicious conduct as unreasonable and
does not establish any presumption, and so "[wihile the appellants deserve
credit for their ingenious and novel attempt to trap the Court in its own
rhetoric, their contention that theper se rule should be set aside must be,
' 78
and is rejected."'
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co. ,'
held the allocation of customers to be aper se violation. Renters of industrial garments agreed not to solicit each other's customers and to discourage customers from changing suppliers. The court found this to be a purely
horizontal market division and rejected defendant's contention that the
plan was merely to prevent one competitor from tortiously interfering with
another's contractual rights with his customers. There was no need to apply a rule of reason analysis to this agreement, as the defendant had
80
urged. '
In United States v. Foley, 8 ' convicted defendants on appeal to the
175. 467 F.2d at 1003.
176. Id at 1003-04.
177. 462 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1972).
178. Id at 52.
179. 568 F.2d 1078, 1090 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978). This appeal arose
from a case filed in the Southern District of Florida naming five concerns and four individuals as defendants in an indictment charging allocation of customers in the uniform rental
business. All defendants except Cadillac pleaded nolo contendere, and Cadillac was found
guilty and appealed.
180. 568 F.2d 1087-90.
181. 598 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980). Six corporate
realtors and three individuals were charged with fixing real estate commissions. A jury
found all defendants guilty.
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Fourth Circuit argued that when Congress made violation of the Sherman
Act a felony rather than a misdemeanor, a specific intent to accomplish a
restraint of trade became an element of the offense. The court disagreed
and held that Congress had82not changed the elements of the offense when
the penalty was increased.
Eight other cases reached
courts of appeals, but none of those decisions
83
concerned antitrust law.'
Reference has already been made 184 to the prosecution of General Motors and Ford for allegedly restricting competition in sales to the fleet market. Since the defendants were acquitted in the criminal case, which was
tried simultaneously with the companion civil case, no court opinion offers
any guidance as to what the law might be concerning a conspiracy formed
and carried out solely by communications through public statements. The
procedure of simultaneous trials, with afternoons reserved for evidence ap182. 598 F.2d at 1335.
183. In United States v. Azzarelli Constr. Co., 612 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 920 (1980), the appeals court decision dealt only with questions of interstate commerce, evidence, and mail fraud. United States v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp., 587
F.2d 782 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), was an appeal based on defendant's contention that
the change in Sherman Act penalties from a misdemeanor to a felony was an ex post facto
law as applied in this case. The circuit court found the contention "without merit." In
United States v. Carlson & Sons, Inc., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,310 (2d Cir. Sept. 28,
1978), the court affirmed a jury conviction which defendants had questioned on grounds
they were not involved in interstate commerce. In United States v. American Service Corp.,
1978-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 62,238 (5th Cir. Sept. 22, 1978) (per curiam), the court affirmed
the sufficiency of allegations that defendants were engaged in interstate commerce. United
States v. Michigan Carton Co., 552 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1977), arose out of a case charging 25
corporations and 50 individuals with price fixing of folding cardboard cartons. See United
States v. Alton Box Board Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
45,076 (Case No. 2505) (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 1976). One of the many corporate defendants
pleading nolo contendere had been acquired by another company which appealed from a
denial of its motion to dismiss the acquired company as a defendant. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that any objections to the form of the indictment was waived by the
nolo plea. 552 F.2d at 202. In the same case, one corporate and two individual defendants
went to trial. The individuals were acquitted by a jury which found the corporation guilty.
The circuit court affirmed the conviction, resolving questions of the sufficiency of the evidence to link the company to the conspiracy and of the conduct of the trial and leave to
withdraw nolo pleas entered after a jury in the original trial was unable to reach a decision
on the grounds that the trial court had not abused its discretion. United States v. Climatrol
Corp., 1976-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 1 61,038 (5th Cir. June 9, 1976). In United States v. Flom,
558 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1977), an individual defendant's conviction was reversed on the basis
of erroneous jury instructions and improper evidence introduced at trial by the government.
The defendants pleaded nolo contendere rather than face a retrial. See United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,074
(Case No. 2400) (M.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 1974). In United States v. Buzzard, 540 F.2d 1383 (10th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977), the court affirmed an individual's conviction
despite arguments involving admissibility of evidence and trial conduct.
184. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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plicable only to the civil case, presents fascinating possibilities for expediting trials of both civil and criminal cases.
Five cases filed in 1973 and 1974 accused major steel companies of
fixing prices and allocating contracts for reinforcing steel bars.' 85 U.S.
Steel, Bethlehem, and Armco were among the defendants. Pleas of nolo
contendere terminated the cases.
Price fixing and collusive bidding in the cardboard and corrugated
container industries led to massive criminal prosecutions. United States v.
Alton Box Board Co. ,186 filed in Chicago, charged twenty-five corporate
and fifty individual defendants with fixing prices for folding cartons, by
agreeing not to underbid a competitor's price, and agreeing on price increases and on list prices. The indictment alleged the defendants' sales of
folding cartons amounted to about $1 billion, making this case one of the
largest in terms of annual sales and also in number of defendants. Nolo
contendere pleas were entered by all defendants except one corporation,
later convicted by a jury, and two individuals, subsequently acquitted.
Substantial fines and jail sentences were imposed.' 87
Two years later in Houston, fourteen corporations and twenty-six individuals were charged with fixing prices for corrugated containers by exchanging price information and bids and submitting noncompetitive bids.
One indictment charged a felony against nine of the corporations and nine
individuals.' 8 8 The second indictment charged the others with a misdemeanor.s 9 The volume of business involved in the two cases was about
$2.2 billion. All defendants in the misdemeanor indictment, and seven of
the nine corporations and three of the nine individuals named in the felony indictment pleaded nolo contendere and very substantial fines were
imposed.
It is interesting to note that six corporate defendants in the felony indict185. See United States v. Armco Steel Corp., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
(CCH) 45,073 (Case Nos. 2337-39) (N.D. & S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 1973). Armco Steel,
Bethlehem Steel and U.S. Steel were among the corporate defendants. These three cases
involved the sale of reinforcing steel bars, as did United States v. Armco Steel Corp., [19701979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,074 (Case No. 2381) (E.D. La. Apr. 23,
1974). United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 45,074 (Case No. 2400) (M.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 1974), alleged conspiracy to rig
bids for reinforced steel bars.
186. [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,076 (Case No. 2505)
(N.D. I11.Feb. 28, 1976). See note 183 supra.
187. Id
188. United States v. International Paper Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case No. 2621) (S.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 1978).
189. United States v. Boise Cascade Corp., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case No. 2622) (S.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 1978).
REP.
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ment and one in the misdemeanor indictment had been defendants in the
earlier Chicago case involving folding cartons. 9 ° Two corporate defendants in the felony indictment, the Continental Group, Inc. and the Mead
Corporation were acquitted in April 1979. Subsequently, a large group of
commercial and industrial users of corrugated cardboard boxes brought a
class action against defendants named in the two indictments. All defendants settled the action out of court except Mead. In September 1980, a jury
in Houston returned a damage verdict of $350 million against Mead in the
private suit, which when trebled to over $1 billion, would be one of the
largest antitrust awards in history.' 9 '
Two other cases are sufficiently peculiar to justify brief mention. An indictment charging Braniff Airways and Texas International Airlines with
excluding Southwest Airlines from intra-Texas air carriage was dismissed
by the court because of the "totality of the circumstances surrounding this
prosecution." These circumstances included the presence of an "unauthorized person" in the grand jury room and the presentation to the grand
jury of evidence selected by the prosecutor from that given before an earlier jury. 192
United States v. Fidelity Equipment Leasing Corp. '9' was an indictment
alleging the defendants fixed prices on "sexually explicit adult motion pictures." Aside from the nature of the commerce involved, the pleading is
noteworthy in that it bears the signature of no official from the Antitrust
Division, and carries the names of only the United States Attorney and
two of his assistants. The case was dismissed the following year.
Certainly the most significant development resulting from the criminal
cases of the seventies has been the drastic increase in sanctions for violations of the Sherman Act. The maximum penalty for corporate defendants
was set at $5,000 when the Act was passed in 1890, and it remained at that
figure for sixty-five years. Five thousand dollars was really nothing more
than a relatively inexpensive license fee to violate the antitrust laws, and it
was so regarded by some companies. In 1955 the maximum fine was raised
190. See notes 183, 186 supra.
191. See Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1980, § A, at 12.
192. United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tex. 1977). The
"unauthorized person" was a former CAB employee who had joined the legal staff of the
Antitrust Division and was in the grand jury room as an "observer." A prior grand jury had
heard much evidence but had not returned any indictment. The prosecutor selected parts of
that evidence for presentation to the second jury. The two airlines were later reindicted and
pleaded nolo confendere. See United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., [1970-1979 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,077 (Case No. 2607) (W.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 1977).
193. [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case No. 2645)
(N.D. Ga. Jun. 10, 1978).
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to $50,000. 194 Thereafter the courts showed a growing willingness to regard an antitrust criminal conviction as a reasonably serious offense, and
in a number of cases a maximum sentence was imposed. This was true
even when the conviction was entered on a plea of nolo contendere, and a
$50,000 fine was not unusual, especially for a large company.
Effective in December of 1974, violation of the Sherman Act was redefined as a felony, and the maximum corporate fine raised to $1 million.
The trial judges appreciated the increased concern about antitrust offenses
reflected in this congressional action, and the sentences imposed for Sherman violations went up accordingly. Fines of several hundred thousand
dollars became almost commonplace, especially for substantial concerns,
and a nolo plea was treated as a plea of guilty for sentencing purposes.
A number of fines of more than a half million dollars have been imposed in recent years. In at least three cases, the court imposed the maximum fine. Cleveland Builders Supply Co. was fined $1 million after
pleading nolo contendere to a price-fixing agreement on ready-mix concrete in the Cleveland area.' 95 In a case charging seven shipping companies with setting rates on ocean freight between Europe and the United
States, the court sentenced Atlantic Container Line, Sea Land Service,
Hapag-Lloyd and United States Lines to pay $1 million each after acceptance of their nolo pleas. 196 After pleas of nolo in a case alleging allocation
of projects and submission of collusive bids in marine construction, J. Ray
McDermott & Co. and Brown & Root Inc. were each fined $1 million. 97
The fines imposed on individual defendants have for various reasons been
much less, the court appropriately considering the individuals' financial
circumstances. Misdemeanor cases usually result in fairly small fines for
convicted individuals. After the offense was raised to a felony, the maximum fine for noncorporate defendants was set at $100,000. Fines on individuals for felony convictions have in some cases been substantial, but
usually have not approached the maximum.
Million dollar fines and billion dollar treble damage verdicts are certainly deterrents to people contemplating Sherman Act violations, but the
average businessman is perhaps even more impressed by the chances of
194. See notes 145-46 and accompanying text supra.
195. United States v. Cleveland Builders Supply Co., [1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE
45,079 (Case No. 2681) (W.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 1979).
REG. REP. (CCH)
196. United States v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 1 45,079 (Case No. 2705) (D.D.C. Jun. 1, 1979).
197. United States v. J. Ray McDermott, Inc., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case No. 2678) (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 1978). In addition to the two
companies, six individuals were named as defendants.
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actually spending time in jail. Years ago, the idea that an individual antitrust defendant would ever see the inside of a prison was regarded as preposterous; only racketeers, who incidentally got involved with antitrust,
were ever sentenced to jail. "Respectable" businessmen who were "pillars
of the community" received occasional fines. In a few rare instances, after
jury convictions or guilty pleas, a short term of imprisonment was imposed, but these were the exceptional situations.
This approach seems to have changed drastically. In some nineteen misdemeanor cases filed in the last decade, the trial judge ordered individuals
imprisoned after they had entered pleas of nolo contendere. The usual sentence was for thirty days but some terms were longer. In one case,
sentences of six months were imposed,' 98 and in another case a defendant
who had previously received probation in an income tax violation case was
required to serve nine months. 99 In the last case, the court explained the
sentencing:
The Court has chosen to write this memorandum dealing with
the imposition of sentences of imprisonment on each of the individuals because of the apparent curiosity that has been aroused
in antitrust circles as a result of the imposition of prison
sentences. This curiosity seems to be aroused because, in only 3
antitrust cases out of 61 arising since 1965, have the district courts
seen fit to impose prison sentences. . . . The sentences of imprisonment were ordered because this Court felt and still feels that
prison sentences in antitrust cases are warranted on the grounds
that they act as a deterrent to others who might be tempted to
commit the same criminal acts.2 °°
The judge pointed out that businessmen who indulge in price rigging and
artificial bidding are cheating the public, and he likened these illegal practices to income tax violations. The judge concluded that to impose only a
sentence of probation in this case would "unduly depreciate" the seriousness of the offense. 2 ° '
The Alton Box Board Co. case has been mentioned above, and reference
198. In United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder]
(CCH) 45,074 (Case No. 2409) (D.N.M. July 18, 1975), the court required three individual defendants to serve six months of their sentences.
199. United States v. Clark Mechanical Contractors, 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,482
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 1973). Eight mechanical contracting firms and six individuals pleaded
nolo contendere to an indictment charging the rigging of bids and the allocation of customers in the Louisville area. The court overruled a motion by one defendant to suspend a 30day jail sentence. United States v. Clark Mechanical Contractors, 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,194 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 15, 1972).
TRADE REG. REP.

200. 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)

201. Id at 94,141.

74,482 at 94,140-41.
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made to the number of defendants indicted and the amount of commerce
affected by the collusive bidding alleged.2 °2 After the nolo contendere
pleas were accepted in that case from practically all of the defendants, the
government made a major effort to persuade the trial judge to impose
some period of actual confinement on many of the individual defendants,
emphasizing the real need for deterrence. The government's sentencing
memorandum in that case argued that the price-fixing conspiracy was "as
egregious as any in the history of the Sherman Act" and that the defendants' conduct was "immoral, antisocial and calculated." After considering
seven factors: level of responsibility, size of the corporation, length of participation in the conspiracy, remorse and rehabilitation, mitigating factors,
salary, and net worth, the government offered the court recommendations
20 3
for sentencing.
The trial judge gave careful and thoughtful consideration to the sentencing problem before him, reviewed the various philosophies behind criminal sanctions and various guidelines for sentencing judges, decided that
confinement was the exception that must be justified, agreed that the crime
charged was serious, malum in se, and offended morality, and concluded
that confinement was appropriate in the cases of some of the individuals
before him.2 ' Fourteen of the forty-eight defendants who pleaded nolo
contendere were sentenced to jail terms ranging from twenty-four hours to
ten days.20 5
After the violations became felonies, the sentences imposed generally
increased, probably averaging three months. In about ten cases filed after
1975, the judge imposed one to three months imprisonment on some defendants after nolo contendere pleas had been entered. In almost all cases,
the court has imposed terms of probation, often accompanied by a substantial term of imprisonment suspended in whole or at least in major part.
Charles Krause was named as a defendant in two separate indictments
alleging that he, his company, and another grain company, rigged bids and
202. See text at note 186 supra.
203. Government's Sentencing Memorandum, printed as Appendix I to the trial court's
Memorandum Opinion on Sentencing. United States v. Alton Box Board Co., 1977-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 61,336 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 1977).
204. Id
205. See Appendix III to Court's Sentencing Memorandum Opinion. Id The government's memorandum stated that "During the past 5 years, over 30 individuals have been
sentenced to jail upon conviction in at least a dozen separate cases" and added that before
1970 individual defendants in the Electrical Equipment and Plumbing Fixtures cases were
sentenced to imprisonment. The defendants' "Response" included a table covering the period July 1955 through 1975 showing 19 cases in which a jail sentence had been imposed on
49 individuals.

1981]

Antitrust Enforcement in the Seventies

allocated contracts for sales of blended fortified foods to the United States
Department of Agriculture for the Food for Peace Program. On pleas of
nolo contendere, Mr. Krause was sentenced to six months in jail in each
case, the sentences to run concurrently.2 °6 In United States v.Arcole Midwest Corp. ,207 each of the two individual defendants was sentenced to one
year imprisonment, and fined $50,000. In United States v. Bertucci Construction Co. ,208 one individual was sentenced to three years in jail.
Neither the pleadings nor any reported memorandum on sentencing by the
judge explains the reason for this sentence.
In a limited number of cases the trial judge has sought "to make the
punishment fit the crime" by requiring some sort of civic, community, or
charitable activity as a condition of the probation or as a prerequisite to
suspension of the sentence. Sometimes the nature of the required "community service" was not specified, or was left subject to the approval of the
probation officer. One judge required 200 hours of "public service work"
and ten Sundays to be spent in jail.20 9 Another specified fifty-one weeks of
"public service" at fifteen hours a week.210 In another case, the convicted
defendant was ordered confined for sixty days to a community treatment
center where he was to render community services.2 1 1
In United States v. H.S. Crocker Co. ,212 some of the individual defendants pleading nolo contendere were required, as a condition of their probation, to make oral presentations before twelve business or civic groups
about the circumstances of the case and their participation in it. In addi206. United States v. Lauhoff Grain Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 45,078 (Case No. 2627, 2628) (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1978); United States v. Krause
Milling Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case Nos.
2629, 2630 (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1978).
207. [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,077 (Case No. 2568)
(N.D. I11. Feb 28, 1977), sentence vacated sub. nom, United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851
(7th Cir. 1978). The indictment also contained 12 counts of mail fraud.
208. [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case No. 2659)
(E.D. La. Sept. 27, 1978). A federal grand jury returned a felony indictment charging 16
contracting firms and 10 individuals with allocating jobs and submitting collusive bids on
river bank stabilization jobs. In addition to the count charging a violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act, the indictment also contained 53 counts of mail fraud or submitting false
statements.
209. United States v. Armored Transport, Inc., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case No. 2694) (C.D. Cal. June 4, 1979).
210. United States v. Ward, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
45,078 (Case No. 2679) (E.D. La. Feb. 16, 1979).
211. See United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 938 (1977).
212. United States v. H.S. Crocker Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 45,074 (Case No. 2372) (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 1974). The indictment named nine
label manufacturers and eight individuals as defendants.
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tion, they were required to submit a written report to the court giving the
details and import of the presentation, and the response thereto.
Three relatively novel and somewhat interrelated techniques for criminal antitrust enforcement were illustrated by cases filed in the seventies,
especially in the later years of the decade. One is the filing of a cluster of
cases growing out of the same or similar type of conduct in related industries in one general area. Eight criminal cases were filed from 1972 to 1978
charging price fixing, bid rigging, and allocation of jobs in the Louisville,
Kentucky area in plumbing, heating, and air conditioning, in electrical
contracting, in general contracting, in paving, in ready-mix concrete, and
in pipeline contracting. There was a companion civil complaint filed for
each of the eight indictments.2 t3 Another illustration is the filing in Chicago of six cases from 1977 to 1979, three involving bid rigging on highway
and airport runway construction, and the other three involving bid rigging
for sheet metal and piping construction.2t 4 On January 17, 1974, seven
criminal cases were filed in Springfield, Illinois charging bid rigging in
connection with highway construction projects.21 5
The second relatively novel technique is to allege a violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act solely with relation to a single job contract. The usual
pattern of both indictments and complaints is to allege a continuing conspiracy over a period of time to allocate contracts and submit collusive
bids. Many of the recent pleadings, however, have confined allegations to
one specific project and charged that the defendants agreed that one business would submit the "lowest" bid for that contract and the others would
submit collusive bids. Such a limited pleading technique has undoubted
213. See United States v. Clark Mechanical Contractors, Inc., [1973-1] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 74,482 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 1973); United States v. Ready Elec. Co., United States v.
Stewart Mechanical Enterprises, Inc., and United States v. Whittenberg Eng'r & Const. Co.,
[1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,075 (Case Nos. 2467, 2488, 2490)
(E.D. Ky. filed June 27, Nov. 18, 20, 1975); United States v. Medusa Aggregates Co., and
United States v. Owensboro River Sand & Gravel Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 45,077 (Case Nos. 2602, 2604) (E.D. Ky. July 22, 1977); United States v.
Hall Contracting Corp., and United States v. United Pipeline Constr. Co., [1 970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case Nos. 2623, 2625) (E.D. Ky. Mar. 3,
1978).
214. See United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 ,(1979); United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851 (7th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Allied Asphalt Paving Co., 451 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ill. 1978); United States
v. Climatemp, Inc., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case
No. 2646) (N.D. Ill. June 12, 1978); United States v. S.J. Reynolds Co., and United States v.
Borg, Inc., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,079 (Case Nos. 2690,
2691).
215. United States v. Huckaba & Sons Constr. Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 45,074 (Case Nos. 2361-2367) (C.D. IUl. Jan. 17, 1974).
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trial advantages but would seem to raise problems if the government
wished to seek the imposition of severe sentences by the court.2" 6
The third novel technique is the use of the felony information. When
Sherman Act violations were misdemeanors, informations instead of indictments could be utilized whenever the government thought it appropriate, but usually were filed only to supersede a technically defective
indictment. After the offense became a felony, constitutional provisions
prohibited the use of an information unless the defendant consented to
waive indictment by a grand jury. In a number of cases in the last several
years informations have been filed, suggesting that the government had
reached an understanding with the defendant before the pleading was filed
that no objection would be made to the absence of an indictment and also
that a plea to the charge of the information would be entered. In five
were settled by pleas of nolo
cases, felony informations were filed; three
21 7
guilty.
of
pleas
by
two
and
contendere
IV.

NON-SHERMAN ACT CRIMINAL CASES

Twenty-two criminal cases filed by the Antitrust Division during the
decade of the seventies were not Sherman Act cases. Seven of these were
petitions for criminal contempt. In three cases 218 fines were imposed after
a plea of nolo contendere or a finding that the defendant was in contempt,
and in the other cases 2 19 the petition was dismissed.
Fifteen cases involved making false statements or obstructing justice.
Eleven of these cases charged the defendant with making false statements
216. See, e.g., Alton Box Board, supra note 199, where the government's argument relied
on the scope of the conspiracy and the commerce involved.
217. United States v. Enderle Metal Prod. Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 45,077 (Case No. 2597) (N.D. Cal. July 7, 1977) (nolo plea); United States v.
Purolator Security, Inc., 11970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 145,078
(Case No. 2639) (E.D. Mich. May 4, 1978) (nolo plea); United States v. Saxon Paper Corp.,
[1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 45,078 (Case No. 2657) (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 21, 1978) (nolo plea); United States v. Alderson Reporting Co., [1970-1979 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,079 (Case No. 2711) (D.D.C. July 2, 1979) (guilty
plea); United States v. Ferrell, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
45,079 (Case No. 2730) (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 14, 1979) (guilty plea).
218. United States v. Greyhound Corp., 370 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. 11. 1974); United States
v. Crocker Co., Inc., [1970-79 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,074 (Case No.
2374) (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 1974); United States v. Twentieth Century Fox, [1970-79 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case. No. 2653) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1978).
219. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); United States v. American Cyanamid Co.,
1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,843 (Case No. 2375) (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1977); United States
v. American Can Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,077 (Case
No. 2594) (N.D. Cal. June 27, 1977). See note 173 supra.
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to an antitrust grand jury, and in six cases the defendant pleaded nolo contendere, guilty, or was convicted.22 ° Three cases involved obstruction of
justice 21 and one charged the making of false statements to the Patent
Office.222
In at least ten cases the government included, in addition to a count
charging a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, counts charging violations of other criminal statutes. This practice was particularly prevalent
in the cases charging bid rigging and collusive bidding on construction
projects. Most frequently the additional counts charged violation of the
mail fraud statute, although some counts alleged conspiracy to defraud the
United States, racketeering, or extortion. One case included fifty-three additional counts alleging mail fraud or submitting false statements, 223 while
others included ten to thirty-five additional counts.224
V.

CONCLUSION

The antitrust enforcement record for the seventies, judged by the cases
initiated during that decade by the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice, is impressive. The average number of cases filed each year during that period was thirty percent more than the average annual number of
cases filed in the preceding quarter century. The percentage of both civil
and criminal cases settled by agreement was appreciably higher in the seventies than in the earlier period. This was particularly true on the criminal
side, where one-third more cases were settled by agreement than in the
period from 1944 to 1968. The mix between civil and criminal cases filed in
220. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Corp., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,074 (Case No. 2386) (D.N.J. July 27, 1975) (guilty plea);
United States v. Swartz, and United States v. Ferranti, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 45,075 (Case Nos. 2460A, 2461A) (M.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 1976) (nolo pleas);

United States v. Hughes, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,077
(Case No. 2618) (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 1977); United States v. Reeves, and United States v.
Watson, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 45,079 (Case Nos. 2702,
2703) (E.D. Mo. July 18, Sept. 5, 1979) (jury verdicts of guilty).
221. United States v. Turen, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REQ. REP. (CCH)
45,074 (Case No. 2387) (D.N.J. June 17, 1974) (guilty plea); United States v. Treadway,
1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,937 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (charges dismissed by court); United
States v. White, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,078 (Case No.
2643) (D.D. C. June 16, 1978) (guilty plea).
222. United States v. Markham, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
45,074 (Case No. 2420A) (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 1975) (jury conviction).
223. See United States v. Bertucci Constr. Co., supra note 208.
224. See, e.g., United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., supra note 215, included 37 mail fraud and two racketeering counts; United States v. VSL Corp., [1970-1979
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,079 (Case No. 2727) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
1979), included 35 mail fraud counts. Several other cases included 10 or 12 such counts.
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the seventies was almost identical with the earlier years, despite the unusually small number of criminal prosecutions initiated in the first two years
of the decade.
The cases of the seventies show a reassuring balance between local and
national cases. Some massive proceedings were initiated, and some of very
limited impact. Many major corporations, the giants of the country's economy, were named as defendants in some of the cases. Proceedings such as
the AT&T case are of great interest as they may establish new interpretations of the antitrust laws. The cases filed also illustrate a willingness to try
new approaches. The GeneralMotors case was one. Unfortunately no appellate court opinion resulted to give any guidance as to whether an antitrust conspiracy can be formed and carried out through public statements
alone. The new approaches to the use of the criminal sanctions, especially
in light of the increased severity of the possible penalties, again reveal an
openness to new ways to secure better antitrust enforcement.
The drastic decline in importance of section 7 of the Clayton Act as an
enforcement weapon gives some pause. In the bank merger field section 7
seems to have disappeared. In nonbank mergers section 7 appears
blunted, and significant mergers, even though challenged, appear to go
through, perhaps with limited injunctive wrappings. The field of conglomerate mergers seems relatively wide open, of course, due in part to
Supreme Court opinions which are not very hospitable to extending section 7 to reach the merger of two large corporations absent clear horizontal
or vertical aspects to the merger.
The most worrisome problem seems to be the almost total absence of
Supreme Court opinions clarifying antitrust law. This of course is the
other side of the coin to the large number of both civil and criminal cases
settled by agreement. It seems in some ways that the Antitrust Division is
turning itself into an administrative or regulatory agency, filing cases
which it terminates by negotiation rather than litigation. The introduction
of the felony information is an example of this trend. Guidance for the
antitrust bar will then come not so much from Court opinions as from
antitrust officials' speeches and actions. Certainly this could radically
change the approach to antitrust law.

